# IMPLEMENTATION AND BEHAVIOUR ANALYSIS OF HONEYPOT

<sup>1</sup>Mintu Patel, <sup>2</sup>Needa Mugut, <sup>3</sup>Shubham Telkar

<sup>1</sup>, <sup>2</sup>, <sup>3</sup>Student <sup>1,2,3</sup>School Of Engineering, <sup>1,2,3</sup>Ajeenkya DY Patil University, Pune, India

*Abstract*: Honeypot is a mechanism to collect data about the attacker's method and pattern of attack and also get useful information about the intrusive activity. It is a well-designed system used to attract hackers into it. The aim of the honeypot is examining, understanding, observing and following hacker's behaviors in order to make more secure system. When a honeypot is positioned in front of a firewall, it can serve as an early warning system, while when positioned behind a firewall, it can serve as part of a defense-in-depth system and can be used to detect attackers who evade the firewall and the intrusion detection system (IDS). This paper deals with the basic features of honeypots, their use in computer networks and their implementation. It explains the different types on the basis of levels i.e. low level interaction honeypot, medium level interaction honeypot are used in this paper to demonstrate how the honeypots are works in real-time environment and how it react at the time of malicious activity.

# Index Terms - firewall, intrusion detection, computer networks, implementation.

# I. INTRODUCTION

Computer network security has progressively become a very wide field of research. Networking has opened various new fields to explore beyond the limitation. This situation has led to the introduction of new threats to computerized systems. With the increasing rate of cyberattacks, information safety has become an important issue all over the world. Different techniques have been used to support the security. Firewall filters and create logs to further examine any bad practices. Intrusion detection systems are used to overcome the limitations of existing network. Intrusion detection system observes the network's traffic and notifies the alerts about any kind of intruders. Various issues were seen with the IDS while facing with an increasing number of false negatives and false positives. Honeypots were then introduced in the network to analyze, understand, observe and follow hacker's behavior to secure the system. Honeypots improve IDS by decreasing the numbers of false positives. With the integrated honeypots network security accuracy increases rather than the only implementing Intrusion detection system. Deployed honeypots 1 must look realistic and is capable for generating logs for all unauthorized activities. Hardware-based honeypots are deployed in big organization as it is expensive and complex to install. Software based low-interaction honeypot are more suitable for the medium and small sized companies. On the basis of detected malicious logs behavior of attacker, tools and methods used by the attacker so that evidence can be obtained and further actions can be taken. In addition of Honeypot in an existing security system can build an active protection system.

# **1.1 Types of Honeypots**

# Low Interaction Honeypots

Low Interaction Honeypots allow only limited amount of interface for an attacker. Low Interaction Try to pretend like a large network but works on a single physical host, but can hardly be used to gain information on the application layer. Therefore when it comes to the detection of new botnets and learning about emerging malware technologies, the same restrictions apply here as with application layer based net flow observation.

# **Medium Interaction Honeypots**

Medium Interaction Honeypot provides more emulated services . Scripts makes it more interactable. As attacker assume it as real system try to gain access and attempt various malicious activity and this provides intruder information save in honeypot system log file. These kind of honeypots emulate various services but fail to stimulate as operating system or real system. Also it cannot implement all details of an application protocol. But it interact sufficiently with the intruder to inject the payload in the system, Which is downloaded and extract the shell code and analyzed it. Developing this honeypot is more complex and time consuming and also initially decide the goals for deployment of this type of honeypot.

# **High Interaction Honeypots**

High Interaction Honeypots make use of the real vulnerabilities of a system or software .High-interaction honeypots are highly complex solutions as they consist of real operating systems and applications. In High Interaction Honeypots nothing is outdid everything is real. High Interaction Honeypots provides more information of an intruder or how it progress or how it executed the particular malware in real-time. Since there is no outdid service, High Interaction Honeypots helps in identifying unknown vulnerabilities. But High Interaction Honeypots are difficult to identify by the attacker. High Interaction Honeypots are risky as operating system can be use for attack and can be compromise

#### © 2019 IJRAR June 2019, Volume 6, Issue 2

#### www.ijrar.org (E-ISSN 2348-1269, P- ISSN 2349-5138)

with the main system. High Interaction Honeypots are used to detect day attack vectors and automatically adapt to any new command and control protocol.

#### **Examples and Functions**

There are a large number of open source or commercially available honeypot, such as the following:

Kippo - Kippo records and even allows for replay of the attack.

Glastopf- A low-interaction honeypot that pretend known web vulnerabilities such as SQL injection.

**Honeyd-** A mid-interaction honeypot that simulates multiple services and hosts on a single machine via virtualization. As a result, it presents a more convincing environment to hackers. Honeyd download the payload and store in honeypot log file for analysis.

**Thug-** A client-side honeypot that pretend as a web browser. It is designed to automatically interact with the malicious website to explore its exploits and malicious artifacts, often in the form of JavaScript.

Ghost-USB - This mounts as a "ghost" USB drive to serve as a honeypot for malware that uses USB drives to replicate.

Dionaea – Its an malware detecting honeypot which replicates the malwares for analysis purpose.

Tpot - This honeypot provide all in one platform by providing various types of honeypots like Kibana for graphical interface.

#### Advantages

- 1. Any activity with the honeypots is unauthorized by definition, therefore reduces false positives.
- 2. Honeypots are designed to identify and capture new attacks and hence false negatives are reduced.
- 3. Though it collects data in small sets, it is valuable and easier to analyse.
- 4. Honeypots act as endpoints, where the activity is decrypted, so the encrypted activities are captured.

5. It is highly flexible as it is extremely adaptable and can be used in a variety of environments.

#### Disadvantages.

- 1. Honeypots have limited field of view as they can only see what interacts with them and cannot detect attacks on other systems.
- 2. Sometimes honeypots can be risky as attacker may take over the honeypot and use it to attack other systems.
- 3. Fingerprinting: Means attacker can easily identify the honeypot.

# **II. LITERATURE REVIEW**

Navneet Kambow has overview of types of honeypot and its advantages and disadvantages. The author also analyzes the log files through these honeypots and honeynets could be used to enhance the Intrusion detection system to make it smarter in catching intrusions.

Yogendra Kumar and Surabhi Singh has focused on legal issues and they define honeypot as entrapment i.e. "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officers."

 $\mathbf{I}_{\mathbf{y}}^{\mathrm{T}}$ First Last Services / Applications Design / Details DTK [31] 1 1997 1999 SMB, SSH, DNS, FTP, Netstat(++) implement many known vulnerabilities BOF [32] 1998 1999 1 Back Orifice, Telnet, SMTP(+) waste intruders time, easy deployment 2002\* 1 NetFacade [42] 1998 not specified class C network emulation 1999 CyberCop String [33] 1999 1 Telnet, FTP, SendMail, SNMP emulating different network devices Specter [44] 1999 2005 1 SMTP, FTP, HTTP and Telnet(+) commercial deployment, decoy files 2002\* 2002\* 1 Sandtrap [57] dialup modem war dialing trapping 2002 2002 1 single-honeypot [43] all ports, but no emulation mere logging, KISS architecture HoneyWeb [68] 2002 2003 1 HTTP various web server header emulation 1 LaBrea [39] 2002 2003 all ports, but no emulation simple TCP tarpit by SYN/ACK SMTPot [58] 2002 2003 1 SMTP spam accumulation, KISS THP [46] 2002 2003 1 SSH (shell), HTTP, FTP coexistence honeypot and real services Jackpot [55] 2002 2004 / delay spam, utilizing spam databases SMTP 1 FakeAP [79] 2002 2005 802.11b AP beacons p.o.c wireless honeypots 2002\* 2007\* 1 HoneyBot [34] SSH, SMTP, FTP, HTML(++) windows vulnerabilities and GUI 1 BigEye [8] 2003 2003 HTTP, FTP emulation of different web servers 0 Spamhole [59] 2003 2003 1 SMTP silent dropping of emails 2003 2003 1 Spampot [60] SMTP platform independence HoneyPerl [36] 2003 2003 1 HTTP, FTP, SMTP, Telnet(+) extensibility by modules 2003\* 2003 1 Decoy Server [45] SMTP, POP3 fake email server traffic 2003\* 2004\* 1 Smoke Detector [8] FTP, HTTP, IMAP, SSH, SMB(++) honeypot as a hardware NetBait [41] 2003 2007\* 1 not specified honeypot as a service HoneyD [28] 2003 2008 1 HTTP, POP3, SMTP, FTP(+) emulating heterogeneous networks KFSensor [38] 2003 2015 1 HTTP, SMTP, MSSQL, FTP(+) commercial deployment of honeypots 2015\* SpamD [56] 2003 1 SMTP tarpit against spam HOACD [35] 2004 2004 1 live bootable CD (HoneyD, Arpd) compare HoneyD ProxyPot [57] 2004\* 2004\*1 SMTP email spammer identification / Impost [37] 2004 2004 all ports, but no emulation full packet sniffing 2005 2006 1 Kojoney [63] SSH (shell activity) first dedicated SSH honeypot compare Nepenthes, Honeytrap Mwcollect [53] 2005 2009 / merging Nepenthes and Honeytrap Nepenthes [47] 2005 2009 / FTP, HTTP, TFTP, MSSQL(++) capture worm payload GHH [70] 2005 2013 1 HHTP-Apache, PHP, MSSQL crawler and search engines Honeytrap [51] 2005 2015 1 HTML, FTP(+), dyn. emulation attacks via unknown protocols HoneyPoint [90] 2006 2014 ICS/Scada, back tracking intruders not specified Dionaea [49] 2009 2013 SMB, FTP, SIP, MYSQL(++) nepenthes successor, capture payload

Marcin Nawrocki\*, Matthias Wahlisch and other co-authors have made an survey paper on various honeypot software and analyze data and also categorise on the basis of ports.

© 2019 IJRAR June 2019, Volume 6, Issue 2				ue 2	www.ijrar.org (E-ISSN 2348-1269, P- ISSN 2349-5138)		
-	Kippo [65]	2009	2014	1	SSH (shell activity)	emulate entire shell interaction	
low	Artemisa [73]	2010	2011	1	VoIP, SIP	Bluetooth Malware	
	bluepot [81]	2010	2015	1	Bluetooth	Bluetooth Malware	
	HoneySink [91]	2011	2011	1	DNS, HTTP, FTP, IRC	bot sink holing	
	HoneyDroid [83]	2011	2014*	1	compare Kippo, HoneyTrap	p.o.c Android OS honeypot	
	Glastopf [67]	2011	2015	1	HTML, PHP, SQL	web applications, vulnerability types	
	Kojoney2 [64]	2012	2015	1	SSH (shell activity)	applying Kojoneys lessons learned	
	Conpots [89]	2013	2015	1	kamstrup, BACnet, mosbus	ICS and SCADA architectures	
	IoTPOT [85]	2014*	2015	1	telnet	IoT (ARM, MIPS, and PPC)	
	honeypot-camera [86]	2014	2015	1	HTTP	Tornado Web, Webcam Server	
	Shockpot [87]	2014	2015	1	Apache, Bash	Shellshock vulnerability	
	Cowrie [66]	2014	2015	1	SSH (shell activity)	Kippos successor	
	Canarytokens [99]	2015	2016	1	URLs, bitcoin, PDF	honeypot tokens	
	elastichoney [69]	2015	2015	1	elasticsearch	elasticsearch RCEs	
lig	Sebek [97]	2003	2011	1	Win32 and Linux systems	attackers OS activities, state-based	
	Honeywall [93]	2005	2009	1	compare Sebek, CentOS	live bootable CD	
	HoneyBow [96]	2006	2007	1	Win32 Systems	extraction of malware, state-based	
	Argos [92]	2006	2014	1	Linux, Windows XP-7	0-day exploits identification, tainting	
	HIHAT [94]	2007	2007	1	php-BB,-Nuke,-Shell,-Myadmin	PHP framework extension, state-based	

OVERVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION OF CLIENT HONEYPOT SOFTWARE BY THEIR INTERACTION LEVEL TYPE. (+) INDICATES SOME ADDITIONAL SERVICES, (\*) MARKS VAGUE TIMESTAMPS.

Savita Paliwal try to give overview on different types of honeypot framework and it's function.

## **III. WORKING**

Honeypot is a system to collect techniques. Honeypots are usually positioned behind the firewall. Honeypot mainly used to put on a variety of services and holes, to attract the occurrence of various attacks, attack data. When an intruder tries to access the system with a malicious activity, the administrator system will be notified. When someone tries to enter the system, a log is generated about all the entries. Even though the attackers gain access in the system and start downloading the data from the database, we can spoof them by storing the fake data which is done by honeypot, but intruder will not be able to know about the fake information. So, by this we can save our system by fooling the intruders. Simultaneously the logs will be generated, and the intruder information like IP address, hardware specification get saved in honeypot and also attack method, that can be used as evidence for further actions.




Fig.1. General Figure of honeypot

#### **IV. SYSTEM REQUIREMENT**

In our demonstration the following resources was deployed:

- 1. Virtual Machine (Vmware)
- 2. Honeypot Packages( Tpot and pentbox)
- 3. Or iso images disc can directly install in Virtual Machine

## **4.1 INSTALLATION OF TPOT**

Tpot can install on various system which requires designated specification. Depended on goals of organization it can install in following ways:

# Standard Installation

Honeypot Packages: adbhoney, ciscoasa, conpot, cowrie, dionaea, elasticpot, heralding, honeytrap, mailoney, rdpy, snare & tanner

**Software or Tools:** cockpit, cyberchef, ELK, elasticsearch head, ewsposter, NGINX, spiderfoot, p0f and suricata **Hardware:** minimum 6-8GB for better function.

128 GB SSD or more for storing event.

medpot,

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Sensor Installation Honeypots Packages: adbhoney, ciscoasa, conpot, cowrie, dionaea, elasticpot, heralding, honeytrap, mailoney, medpot, rdpy, snare & tanner Software or Tools: cockpit Hardware: minimum 6-8GB for better function.

128 GB SSD or more for storing event.

Industrial Installation
Honeypots Packages: conpot, cowrie, heralding, medpot, rdpy
Software or Tools: cockpit, cyberchef, ELK, elasticsearch head, ewsposter, NGINX, spiderfoot, p0f and suricata
Hardware: minimum 6-8GB for better function.
128 GB SSD or more for storing event.

Collector Installation (goal is to catching credentials)
Honeypots Packages:: heralding
Software or Tools: cockpit, cyberchef, ELK, elasticsearch head, ewsposter, NGINX, spiderfoot, p0f and suricata
Hardware: minimum 6-8GB for better function.
128 GB SSD or more for storing event.

NextGen Installation (Glutton replacing Honeytrap, HoneyPy replacing Elasticpot)
Honeypots Packages:: adbhoney, ciscoasa, conpot, cowrie, dionaea, glutton, heralding, honeypy, mailoney, rdpy, snare & tanner
Software or Tools: cockpit, cyberchef, ELK, elasticsearch head, ewsposter, fatt, NGINX, spiderfoot, p0f and suricata
Hardware: minimum 6-8GB for better function.
128 GB SSD or more for storing event.

For successful deployement of tpot must require a working, non-proxied, internet connection requires for all tpot installation.

# 4.2 INSTALLATION OF PENTBOX


Virtual Machine (Vmare) Pentbox Package OR iso image Harware: Just a normal system

## V. ARHITECTURE

General architecture system design of honeypot architecture is shown in Fig-1. Entire network is firstly protected by a firewall, then data layers are separated from network inside the organization and outside customers' or operations' network. Organization network is then protected by a mechanism called as honeynet, which is a network of computers participation in honeypot architecture. For enhancement of security and detection IDS is implemented in the system. Monitoring control system stores the logs created by the honeynet and spectate all the incoming entries in the network. To monitored the system organization need special honeynet administrator.

### **Hosted Honeypots**

Deployments of honeypot on a singular system are said to be hosted. Mainly consist of low interaction Honeypot. As it is deployed on singular physical system, it required minimum hardware and software resources.




Hosted Honeypot

### Fig2. Hosted Honeypot

### Network (Honeynet)

Honeynets are nothing more than an architecture. To successfully deploy a honeynet, you must plan accurately and deploy the honeynet architecture. The gateway to the honeynet architecture is what we call a honeywall. This is a gateway device that differentiate honeypots from the rest of the world. Any traffic going to or from the honeypots must go through the honeywall. This gateway is traditionally a 2 layer bridging device, i.e. no exposable of main system while interacting with honeynets.Below we see a diagram of this architecture.



## Fig.3. Architecture of honeynet


# VI. ANALYSIS (REPORT)

Our hosted Network Detected various intruder and on that basis the following points reveal

- 1. Most of intruder can not differentiate between real system and honeypot.
- 2. Most attack was on port no. 80, 23 etc as it is easy to crack.
- 3. On unsuccessful attempt most of intruder did not attempt again.
- 4. Only External intruder detected.
- 5. The inflow traffic was increase after deploying honeypot.
- 6. The following data id of 1 week on that basis below table and diagram ae created

Sr. No.	Port No.	No. Of Attempts	Name Of Ports
1	80	39.39%	HTTP
2	23	21.21%	TELNET
3	21	27.27%	FTP
4	443	3.03%	HTTP over Secure Shell
5	25	9.09%	SMTP

Table no.01. Intruders attack on the basis of 1 week analysis



HONEYPOT ACTIVATED ON PORT 80 (2019-09) 03:49	:28 -500)		
INTRUSION ATTEMPT DETECTED! from 192.1 GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.149.150 Connection: keep-alive Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0 Accept: text/html.application/khtml+xml, Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-US.en;q=0.9	; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/5	37.36 (KMTML, Like Gecko) Chr	
INTRUSION ATTEMPT DETECTED) from 192.1	68.149.1:55241 (2019-11-15	03:54:40 -0500)	
GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.149.150 Connection: keep-alive			
User-Agent: Mozilla/S.0 (Windows NT 18.0 Accept: image/webp.image/apng.image/*,*/ Referer: http://192.168.149.158/ Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-US.en:qw8.9		37.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chr	ome/78.0.3904.97 Safar1/537.36
	Fig.5.IDS(pentbox)	generates the alert.	

	Access denied - M	ozilla Firefox			(	9 0	0
Access denied × +							
<ul> <li>③   127.0.0.1</li> </ul>	C'	Q Search	☆	4	ŵ	D	=
Most Visited ~ MOSt Offensive Security	y 🔨 Kali Linux 🥆 Kali Docs	🔨 Kali Tools 📥 I	Exploit-DB 🐚 Aire	rack-n	g		**
Access denied							
HTTP Referrer login fai	led						
IP Address login failed							

2019-11-15 05:22:01 -0500

Fig.6. Screen from attacker side

### VII. CONCLUSION

Honeypot is a useful tool for attracting and trapping attackers, capturing information. Security is the essential element of any organization, though the security provided by the honeypots based on hardware setups are very expensive for small and medium scaled organization. A Software based honeypots are effective for them. Among all these types of Honeypot low-interaction Honeypot is the most used Honeypot, because it is easy to implement and manage but High-interaction Honeypot is most secure and efficient. These honeypots provide security as well as generates a log about all entries in the system which is very helpful to find the intrusive activity in the system. But the honeypot must need to upgrade their policy time to time for new methods and types of attacks. It can't be said as a solution but it is a good enhancement for the security system. Defining the malicious activity are totally depended on how the organisation set their goals and policy. From this paper also can concluded that it is very difficult to detect the internal intruder and complex solution lead to enhancement of security. High interaction Honeypot are complex to deploy but has high security levels.

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