



ALGORITHMS BEYOND JURISDICTION: RETHINKING CONSUMER REDRESS IN THE BORDERLESS BAZAAR OF E-COMMERCE

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Abstract

The expeditious evolution of transboundary electronic commerce has radically restructured international trade, questioning existing legislatures within territorial jurisdiction. This article scrutinizes the way algorithmic governance, platform-driven decision-making, and data-centric business models shakes the pillar of private international law highlighting the prevalent regulations like ‘territorial nexus’, ‘minimum contacts’, and ‘forum selection’ are assumed to be not enough to question the implications by dematerialised digital environments where digital barter can be done without bodily existence.

Through a qualified scanning of Indian, European Union, and United States jurisprudence, the paper points out gradual discrepancies in judicial reliefs in problems of jurisdictional boundaries, intermediary liability, and consumer protection. It specifies that when courts have tried to intake through concepts like purposeful avilment and targeting these doctrines suffers to address automated, data-driven interactions shaped by opaque algorithms. At the end, users encounter such barriers like jurisdictional uncertainty, enforcement challenges, unequal bargaining power, and limited access to effective remedies, particularly in low-value transboundary consumer disputes.

The paper further critiques the structural asymmetry caused by platform sovereignty, where private digital intermediaries enforce regulatory-measures like control without corresponding accountability. In response, it recommends a normative transition toward consumer-centric jurisdiction, conditional intermediary liability based on algorithmic transparency, and stronger integration of data protection with consumer law. This study advocates for international cooperation through harmonised legal standards and soft-law instruments. This article necessitates a doctrinal recalibration that combines legal regulations with infield transboundary electronic spaces by reconsidering cross boundary limits and pointing out algo-capacities.

Keywords: Algorithms, Sovereignty, Intermediaries, AI, E-Commerce.

1. Introduction

1.1 Rise of AI-Driven Cross-Border E-Commerce

A remarkable growth is witnessed in the twenty-first century in electronic commerce due to enrichment of artificial intelligence (AI)-driven digital marketplaces. From being a complementary retail channel, cross-border e-commerce has emerged as giant ship of global commerce, fuelled by algorithmic recommendation systems, predictive analytics, automated pricing models, and data-driven personalization engines. Today, digital platforms connect users from all over the world at a time and operates without bodily presence in the jurisdiction of the users.

At present, artificial intelligence has stands as the backbone of many aspects of online commerce, from ‘targeted advertising’ and ‘dynamic pricing’ to ‘supply-chain management’ and ‘automated dispute resolution’. ‘Recommendation algorithms’ determines which products to appear before consumers, machine-learning systems scrutinize creditworthiness, and ranking mechanisms subtly reforms consumer perception on digital platforms. By swift act at remarkable speed, these systems generate commercial outcomes often move beyond the limits of traditional territorial limits. AI driven commerce acts different from traditional transboundary transactions, without physical subsidiaries or brick-and-mortar establishments. Online platforms are able to approach consumers in multiple jurisdictions such as India, the European Union, and the United States at the same time through geo-targeted advertising and data-driven analytics, even without opening a local office. This shift toward a dematerialised form of commerce results in complex jurisdictional determination as traditional legal principles were mainly revolves around ideas of ‘physical presence’, ‘territorial links’, ‘and measurable harm’.

1.2 Collapse of Territorial Boundaries in Digital Marketplaces

Existing traditional regulations like Private international law has basically works on the knowledge that commercial transactions were tied to a specific geographical location. Principles called “lex loci contractus,” “lex loci delicti,” and “forum non conveniens” were therefore relied on clear spatial links. In such era of digital transactions, these spatial assumptions have become increasingly difficult to sustain.

In “Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.”, a U.S. federal court enforce the well-known “sliding scale” test to navigate jurisdiction relied on the level of interactivity of a website. (*Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.*, 1997). Though such attempt was assumed to be innovative at the time, the Zippo framework depends on a distinction between passive and active websites. These differences fade away with the emergence of algorithmically interactive digital platforms. Contemporary digital cites works in continuous and largely autonomous manner, leaving the traditional active–passive classification incapable of shaping modern jurisdictional challenges.

The “Court of Justice of the European Union” (CJEU), in “*eDate Advertising GmbH v. X*”, similarly marked that harm caused through online activities may arise in multiple jurisdictions simultaneously, allowing claimants to call for actions before the courts of the relevant states (*eDate Advertising GmbH v. X*, 2011). This approach reflected a move beyond strict territorial thinking and recognised the inherently transnational nature of harm in the digital environment.

In India, the Delhi High Court in “*Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy*” adopted the principle of “purposeful availment,” holding that the very lenient authorisation of a site is not enough to establish jurisdiction unless it can be shown that the defendant deliberately targeted consumers within the forum state (“*Banyan Tree Holding v. Murali Krishna Reddy*, 2009”). While this doctrinal approach remains conceptually sound, its application becomes increasingly complex in the advent of processes called AI-driven systems that autonomously target users on the basis of behavioural data without any explicit geographical intent. The erosion of clear territorial boundaries has therefore weakened traditional jurisdictional anchors. As a result, courts often fluctuate between broader digital effects-based reasoning and a more cautious adherence to territorial limits, leading to inconsistent judicial outcomes.

1.3 Emergence of Algorithmic Governance and Platform Sovereignty

Over time, digital platforms have come to function as quasi-sovereign regulatory bodies. Through the establishment of operational standards, content moderation policies, dispute resolution processes, and algorithmic ranking systems, they exert regulatory control that was once largely exercised by states.

Algorithmic governance describes the growing reliance on computational systems to manage and structure decision-making. In online marketplaces, algorithms set pricing patterns, prioritise sellers, screen consumer reviews, and enforce platform policies. While these automated processes shape both economic opportunities and consumer experiences, they largely remain opaque and privately managed.

In “*Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Amway India Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.*”, the Delhi High Court examined the scope of intermediary liability in the context of online marketplaces and observed that platforms exercising active control over product listings cannot automatically claim blanket safe harbour protection (*Amazon Seller Services v. Amway India*, 2020). This judicial reasoning implicitly recognises the regulatory influence exercised by digital platforms. Similarly, in “*Google LLC v. CNIL*”, the “Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)” restricted the extraterritorial application of the “right to be forgotten,” attempting to balance the free flow of global data with the preservation of European Union sovereignty (*Google LLC v. CNIL*, 2019). The decision highlights the continuing tension between the transnational operations of digital platforms and the regulatory boundaries of sovereign states.

1.4 Consumer Vulnerability in the Borderless Bazaar

Consumers engaging in cross-border digital transactions often experience unequal bargaining power, lack of transparency, and procedural challenges. Many click-wrap agreements incorporate foreign jurisdiction and arbitration provisions, which can effectively deter consumers from seeking redress.

The UK Supreme Court in “*Lloyd v. Google LLC*,” restricted representative actions in data privacy litigation by requiring proof of individualised harm (*Lloyd v. Google LLC*, 2021). While the judgment is firmly rooted in established doctrine, it also reveals the structural obstacles faced in addressing mass digital harm through collective legal actions.

The doctrine of “forum non conveniens” may also deepen consumer vulnerability in cross-border disputes. In “*Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*”, the U.S. Supreme Court reinforced the disposal of a matter concerning forum non conveniens grounds even though the alternative forum provided less favourable substantive law (*Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*, 1981). Although the case was not related to e-commerce, it demonstrates the courts’ tendency to defer to forum selection principles, which can place plaintiffs at a disadvantage.

1.5 Need for Doctrinal Recalibration

The growth of dematerialised commerce requires a corresponding evolution in private international law. Jurisdictional principles that rely primarily on territorial presence are insufficient to govern AI-driven platforms operating across borders.

In “*Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia*”, the Supreme Court of India underscored the importance of preventing forum shopping while protecting access to justice (*Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia*, 2015). By combining statutory interpretation with practical fairness considerations, the Court adopted an approach that may provide useful insights for the resolution of cross-border consumer disputes.

The decision in “*World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Reshma Collection*” likewise stressed the need to establish purposeful targeting in online trademark related problems (*World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Reshma Collection*, 2014). Taken together, these judgments demonstrate an emerging effort by Indian courts to adjust traditional territorial doctrines to the realities of the digital age. Moving forward, the development of private international law should focus on consumer-centric principles, stronger transparency obligations, and workable mechanisms for cross-border cooperation and enforcement.

2. Theoretical Framework: Algorithmic Governance and Digital Sovereignty

2.1 Conceptualizing Algorithmic Governance

Algorithmic governance talks about the system in which rules are curated and implemented using computational systems. In the context of digital marketplaces, algorithms work as regulatory tools that manipulate ‘product visibility’, ‘pricing strategies’, and ‘dispute resolution mechanisms’ that depend on publicly accountable institutions, algorithmic governance functions through proprietary code controlled by private entities. Decisions are done by automated processes against human influence. Absence of clarity in these systems makes judicial oversight and evidentiary assessment considerably more tough. Courts have rapidly questioned with the difficulty of assessing conduct manipulated or driven by algorithms. In the case of “*Google v. CNIL*”, the “Court of Justice of the European Union” acknowledged the worldwide reach of

algorithmic indexing but declined to expand the territorial limits of regulatory obligations on a global scale (*Google LLC v. CNIL*, 2019). The ruling illustrates judicial caution in shaping worldwide responsibilities on digital intermediaries.

2.2 Platform Capitalism and Private Regulatory Power

The aggregation of data and the exploitation of network effects generate value for digital intermediaries, which is referred to as platform capitalism. These platforms not only facilitate transactions, but the conditions and rules that govern participation are also determined by them. In “*Amazon Seller Services Pvt Ltd v. Amway*”, it was observed by the Delhi High Court that platforms exercising a degree of editorial or supervisory control over content and transactions may bear responsibilities comparable to those of publishers (*Amazon Seller Services v. Amway India*, 2020). The traditional characterization of platforms as neutral intermediaries is questioned by this reasoning. Simultaneously, digital platforms reflect private regulatory authority in the unilateral drafting of standard-form contracts. The application of domestic consumer protection norms can be effectively sidelined or weakened by such agreements, which often contain arbitration clauses and provisions selecting foreign governing law.

2.3 Digital Sovereignty vs. Territorial Jurisdiction

The efforts of states are denoted by digital sovereignty to exercise regulatory control over data flows and digital infrastructures within their jurisdictions. Nonetheless, such regulatory fragmentation is often opposed by global digital platforms, arguing that maintaining uniform operations across international markets determine the efficiency and functionality of their services.

In *eDate Advertising*, a less rigid concern to jurisdiction was adopted by the CJEU, acknowledging that harm arising from online activities may happen in multiple locations (*eDate Advertising GmbH v. X*, 2011). On the other hand, judicial restraint was reflected by the decision in *Google v. CNIL* by declining to broaden the application of EU law on a global scale (*Google LLC v. CNIL*, 2019). The continuing tension between the assertion of state sovereignty and the transnational character of digital governance is highlighted by the divergence in jurisprudence.

In *Banyan Tree*, India’s courts devised a targeting guideline to establish jurisdiction in online disputes, seeking to preserve territorial limits while acknowledging the realities of internet-based interactions (*Banyan Tree Holding v. Murali Krishna Reddy*, 2009). However, the rise of algorithmic targeting has complicated this framework, as it makes it more tough to establish transparent evidence of intentional targeting by a party.

2.4 Relevance of Private International Law in Dematerialized Commerce

Private international law continues to act as the chief regulatory doctrine to question cross-border implications, but the existing regulations demand adaptation in the advent of platform-mediated transactions. U.S. advanced the minimum contacts doctrine that demands a defendant to demonstrate purposeful availment of the forum state (*International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 1945). Within digital environments, algorithmic targeting may satisfy these essentials even in the trauancy of a tangible physical presence. Meanwhile, the interplay between forum-selection clauses and consumer protection norms desires for careful reconsideration.

3. Jurisdictional Ambiguity in Trans-Border Consumer Disputes

The blooming of cross-border e-commerce has unveiled crucial uncertainties within traditional jurisdictional doctrine. Classical private international law was drafted on events that could be clearly focused in physical space, the place where a contract was executed, where a tort occurred, or where the parties were physically present. AI-driven commerce unsettles these territorial anchors. Digital interactions now take place through dispersed servers, algorithmic decision systems, and cloud infrastructures that cannot easily be tied to a single jurisdiction. At the end, courts increasingly encounter crucial threshold questions: Where is a digital contract concluded? Where does algorithmic harm occur? Which sovereign authority is entitled to exercise jurisdiction?

This section closely examines the doctrinal uncertainties concerning jurisdiction in the digital market place.

3.1 Understanding the Jurisdiction in Online Transactions

3.1.1 The Structural Problem

Such trans-boundary commercial disputes navigating jurisdiction desires three main principles: territorial presence, the consent of the parties, and the effects produced within the forum state. The blooming of artificial intelligence in digital market place doubts the effective application of each of these bases. Often automated systems lead digital contracts to its ends where a consumer completes acceptance by click-wrap interface, while the performance of the agreement is done through algorithmic processes. Meanwhile, the technological and corporate structure behind these transactions is frequently dispersed. Servers may be located in several jurisdictions, the company may be incorporated in one country, operate primarily in another, and connect consumers worldwide through targeted online advertising. This layered fragmentation makes the traditional analysis of jurisdiction far less straightforward.

3.1.2 The Zippo Sliding Scale and Its Limitations

One of the earliest judicial attempts to address jurisdiction on the internet appeared in “*Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.*”. In this case, the “U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania” advanced what later became known as the “sliding scale” approach for determining jurisdiction in online activities (*Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.*, 1997). The court broadly classified websites into three categories:

1. Passive websites that only provide information
2. Interactive websites that allow communication between the user and the host
3. Websites through which commercial transactions are carried out

From this derivation it is said jurisdiction could be established when a defendant over the time conducted commercial transactions with users located in the forum state. Although pioneering, the Zippo test was depended on a relatively static understanding of web architecture. Contemporary AI-driven platforms are inherently interactive. Even websites that appear “passive” often incorporate tracking cookies, dynamic content personalisation, and targeted advertising tools. In such environments, where algorithmic engagement is constant and data-driven, the sliding-scale approach loses much of its practical relevance.

Moreover, the test does not adequately account for AI-mediated targeting. A platform may not intentionally direct its services toward a particular jurisdiction. Instead, machine-learning systems adjust outreach automatically based on user behaviour patterns. This makes the attribution of intent doctrinally difficult. Later U.S. decisions gradually moved toward a “purposeful availment” approach derived from “*International Shoe Co. v. Washington*” (*International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 1945). Even this standard, however, assumes conduct that can be traced to identifiable human direction.

3.2 Targeting Doctrine

The targeting doctrine refines the jurisdictional inquiry by examining whether a defendant has knowingly navigates its activities toward a particular forum.

3.2.1 Indian Jurisprudence: Banyan Tree

In “*Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy*,” the Delhi High Court held that authorisation to a site cannot by itself impose jurisdiction (*Banyan Tree Holding v. Murali Krishna Reddy*, 2009). Instead, the Court required:

- Clear encounter of consumers in the forum state
- meaningful interactive engagement
- Evidence of purposeful availment

The court addresses if we treat simple global accessibility as sufficient, a defendant may be under the jurisdiction in every country, a result lacking consistency with regulations of fairness. Though AI-regulated advertisement incapacitates evidentiary transparency of targeting. Algorithms customise advertisement focusing on search history. A seller does not directly target consumers but machine learning indirectly shapes

visibility within India leading towards a theoretical question that whether algorithmic targeting satisfy the desires of purposeful availment? If so, should liability call upon even in the absence of conscious intent?

3.2.2 European Union: eDate Advertising

In “*eDate Advertising GmbH v. X*,” the CJEU establishes if a victim of online defamation may call for an action either in the member state where the publisher is situated or where the victim’s “centre of interests” is located (*eDate Advertising GmbH v. X*, 2011). Such judgements go beyond rigid territorial boundaries by addressing that online problems arising across borders but may have a concentrated impact at the victim’s place of residence.

EU jurisprudence on customization therefore incorporates a victim-oriented approach. Under the Brussels I Recast framework, consumers may also start proceedings in their own domicile if the trader points out activities to that Member State.

Yet algorithmic targeting complicates the analysis. A key question arises: does automated geo-targeted advertising amount to “directed activity”? EU jurisprudence increasingly treats it as such, although the doctrinal position is still developing.

3.3 Minimum Contacts Principle

The foundational U.S. doctrine laid down in “*International Shoe Co. v. Washington*” asks a defendant should have “minimum contacts” with the forum state so that stabling the suit does not irritate the primitive notions of fair play and substantial justice (*International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 1945).

The assessment of minimum contacts generally consider:

- Purposeful availment
- Foreseeability
- Reasonableness

AI-driven platforms often assist ongoing commercial relationships with consumers across several jurisdictions. Subscription services, recurring transactions, and localised payment gateways may therefore make adequate minimum contacts. Ecommerce sites however sometimes depend on the truancy of physical presence as a defence. As commerce becomes increasingly dematerialised, the concept of minimum contacts may need to be interpreted in functional rather than strictly territorial terms.

3.4 Forum Selection Clauses in Click-Wrap Agreements

Digital contracts generally comprise mandatory arbitrational regulations also with provisions choosing a foreign forum for dispute resolving.

3.4.1 Piper Aircraft and Forum Non-Conveniens

In “*Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*”, the U.S. Supreme Court enforce discharge in the event of forum non conveniens even though the alternative forum provides less favourable substantive law (*Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*, 1981). Even such cases concerned aviation tort claims, its reasoning has sway the conduct of forum-determining clauses. Courts generally respect contractual autonomy unless such clauses are shown to be unreasonable or unfair.

In consumer e-commerce, however, the unequal equilibrium in bargaining power is remarkable. Click-wrap agreements are typically non-negotiable, and enforcing foreign jurisdiction clauses can impactfully constrain a consumer’s right to justice.

3.4.2 UK Position: Lloyd v. Google

In “*Lloyd v. Google LLC*”, the UK Supreme Court restricted the scope of representative claims in data privacy litigation, tracing the need for strict procedural requirements (*Lloyd v. Google LLC*, 2021). Although the case did not on face criticise forum-selection clauses, it mirrors judicial caution in tackling large-scale digital claims.

Courts must therefore seek steadiness between ensuring contractual certainty and safeguarding consumer safeguard.

3.5 Snagging in the selection of laws

Choice-of-law clauses in digital contracts sometimes proposes jurisdictions that are favourable to corporations. This can create substantive inequality where consumer protection standards vary significantly between legal systems.

The interplay concerning jurisdiction and applicable law can generate tricky results. A court may seek jurisdiction over such dispute but still try critical foreign laws.

3.6 Bindingness of foreign decisions

To give enforcement to foreign laws tells a different doctrinal struggle. Under Section 44A of the Indian “Code of Civil Procedure”, decisions given by courts in responsive regions may be enforced in India, subject to the conditions governing conclusiveness (Code of Civil Procedure, 1908). However, many implications arising from digital commerce concerning companies incorporated in jurisdictions that are not identified as reciprocating territories.

Even where legal recognition is possible, the cost and complexity of enforcement often make it economically impractical for consumers to pursue claims involving small amounts.

3.7 Small-Value Cross-Border Claims and Practical Inaccessibility

Most disputes arising from e-commerce involve relatively small amounts, such as defective products, refusal of refunds, or misleading representations. Pursuing litigation across borders in such cases is often prohibitively costly.

Several structural barriers contribute to this difficulty:

- Translation costs
- Travel expenses
- Procedural complexity
- Enforcement uncertainty

As a result, many consumers choose not to pursue their claims, allowing platforms to operate with relatively limited accountability.

This enforcement gap highlights a systemic weakness in Private International Law in the context of borderless electronic commerce.

4. Structural Implications for E-Consumers

This section examines the main structural harms faced by cross-border e-consumers and places them within the context of comparative judicial doctrine.

4.1 Jurisdictional Uncertainty as Access-to-Justice Suppression

4.1.1 Doctrinal Ambiguity as Structural Deterrence

Private international law has traditionally sought to balance fairness to defendants with the plaintiff’s capacity to access justice. This balance has become increasingly strained in advent of electronic market place. Consumers frequently face uncertainty about:

- Which forum has the authority to adjudicate the dispute;
- Whether domestic consumer protection laws are applicable;
- Whether a favourable domestic decisions may be enforced in another jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of India in “*Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia*” observed that jurisdictional rules should guard against forum shopping and protect defendants from unnecessary harassment (*Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia*, 2015). However, in cross-border consumer disputes, a strict territorial interpretation of such rules may end up discouraging or limiting legitimate claims.

Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court in “*Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California*” limited the scope of significant regulations by insisting on a deep bond between the forum and the claim (*Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California*, 2017). Although the reasoning is doctrinally consistent, such strict nexus requirements can place consumers at a disadvantage when the harm arises from corporate activities that operate on a global scale.

4.1.2 Empirical Suppression of Low-Value Claims

When we talk about non doctrinal field studies on consumer security it reflects that disputes concerning petty cross-border claims are seldom drawn before the courts. Impact assessments conducted by the European Commission prior to the adoption of the “Online Dispute Resolution Regulation (EU) No 524/2013” (European Commission, 2023), indicated that fewer than 9% of consumers pursue judicial remedies in cross-border cases because of the high costs and procedural complexity involved (Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012). The same structure is found in India where disputes are settled normally in informal manner concerning transboundary regulations that is done specifically due to uncertain enforcement claims against foreign entities.

4.2 Enforcement Asymmetry and the Illusion of Remedy

4.2.1 Execution Barriers Against Foreign Platforms

Even when domestic consumer commissions grant relief under the “Consumer Protection Act, 2019”, enforcement against corporations incorporated abroad often depends on reciprocal recognition under section 44A of the “Code of Civil Procedure, 1908” (Code of Civil Procedure, 1908). Without such reciprocal arrangements, the practical enforcement of these decisions becomes extremely difficult.

The Supreme Court of India in “*Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Celem S.A.*” clarified the conditions under Section 13 CPC for the enforcement of foreign judgments (*Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Celem S.A.*, 2017). However, consumer decrees arising from cross-border disputes seldom meet these enforceability requirements, as jurisdictional objections are often raised in foreign courts.

4.2.2 Comparative Enforcement Constraints

The U.S. Supreme Court in “*Daimler AG v. Bauman*” significantly censored the scope of general jurisdiction over foreign corporations (*World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Reshma Collection*, 2013). As an outcome, consumers face greater difficulty bringing actions against multinational corporate giants in forums that are not relatively connected to the organisation’s stand of incorporation or prime working place.

4.3 Contractual Subordination Through Adhesive Click-Wrap Architecture

Forum Selection Clauses as Structural Shields

AI-driven marketplaces commonly include clauses that designate exclusive jurisdiction in foreign courts. The Supreme Court of India in “*Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corp. Ltd.*” affirmed the policies of party autonomy in commercial contracts (*Daimler AG v. Bauman*, 2014). Though in reality in consumer contract the parties rarely possess equal bargaining power.

Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court in “*Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute*” (*Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute*, 1991) reinforce a forum-determination clause painted on a passenger ticket. Although deduction was justified on grounds of certainty and efficiency, the reasoning sits uneasily with digital adherence contracts where consent is mostly automated and effectively unavoidable. EU law takes a more protective approach. Under “Brussels I Recast Articles 17–19”, the enforceability of such clauses in consumer disputes is restricted (*Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California*, 2017).

The CJEU in “*Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG*” (*Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG; Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v. Heller*, 2010) further clarified that a consumer’s domicile may prevail over contractual terms where the trader is shown to have pointing directives inclining toward that state.

Such regulatory oversight thus points out an unended complexity within formal glimpse of consent and considerations of considerable fairness.

4.4 Algorithmic Opacity and Evidentiary Imbalance

4.4.1 Targeting and the Burden of Proof

Within these regulatory mandates focusing targeting consumers are asked to call that the defendant deliberately directed its activities toward the forum.

In “*Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A Murali Krishna Reddy*” (*Banyan Tree Holding v. Murali Krishna Reddy*, 2010), the Delhi High Court held that jurisdiction requires proof of deliberate targeting and that mere accessibility of a website is not sufficient. In practice, however, such evidence may be embedded within proprietary advertising algorithms that remain inaccessible to consumers.

Likewise, the UK Supreme Court in “*Lloyd v. Google LLC*” (*Lloyd v. Google LLC*, 2021) declined to allow representative claims for alleged data misuse in the absence of proof of individual damage. The ruling highlights the significant evidentiary burden placed on claimants in cases involving algorithmic harm.

4.4.2 Algorithmic Pricing and Discrimination

AI-driven ecommerce systems take advantage of dynamic pricing algorithms where price variations done based on browsing behaviour or device type can raise concerns regarding unfair trade practices.

The CJEU in “*Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos*” (*Google Spain SL v. AEPD*, 2014) recognized that digital intermediaries play a significant role in controlling the flow of information online. Although the case primarily dealt with data protection, the acknowledgment of such platform influence weakens the neutrality arguments often relied upon by intermediaries to avoid liability.

Lack of transparency makes it tough for users to establish discrimination, further reinforcing the existing asymmetry.

4.5 Data Exploitation and Extraterritorial Privacy Vulnerabilities

Cross-border AI marketplaces often disseminate user data through diverse jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of India in *Justice “K S Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India”* (*K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India*, 2017) traces informational privacy as core constitutional right. However, applying and enforcing privacy protections against foreign data fiduciaries endures to pose remarkable institutional challenges.

The CJEU in its Schrems rulings (Case C-362/14; Case C-311/18) (*Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner*, 2015; *Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland*, 2020) set aside transatlantic data transaction mechanisms due to insufficient safeguards, tracing issues of regulatory sovereignty. Such decisions pin points the fragility of trans-boundary privacy enforcement and its immediate impact on e-consumers.

4.6 Collective Redress Deficiencies

Algorithmic harms appear to be widespread yet individually minor.

The U.S. Supreme Court in “*AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*” (*J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro*, 2011) upheld arbitration clauses that preclude class actions, thereby limiting avenues for collective redress, especially in digital consumer disputes. Representative complaints are permitted in India under consumer protective regulations but procedural rigidity and restricted class action regulation undermine practical enforceability.

4.7 Counterfeit Goods and Cross-Border Fraud

Global AI marketplaces anchor third-party sellers operating across multiple jurisdictions.

In “*Christian Louboutin SAS v. Nakul Bajaj*” (*Christian Louboutin SAS v. Nakul Bajaj*, 2018), the Delhi High Court establish that platforms taking active control over listings may be made responsible for trademark infringement issues. Such derivation lights on the consumers who buys counterfeit goods from foreign sellers often left without exit unless the platform itself is held liable.

4.8 Psychological Manipulation and Dark Patterns

The design of digital interfaces sculpts consumer decision-making in a uniform manner. The “EU Digital Services Act” (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065), prevents the use of dark patterns that compromise user autonomy (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065).

Algorithmic urgency cues and default opt-in strategies can cripple informed consent. Demonstrating such manipulative practices in court stands tough in the absence of clarity principles.

5. Indian Legal Framework

India's regulation of cross-border AI-driven e-commerce does not stem from a single, unified private international law framework. Rather, it originates from a fragmented normative structure comprising consumer protection laws, intermediary liability rules, data governance statutes, and civil procedure provisions governing transnational adjudication. This staged concept presents slight recognition against comprehensive reform.

The key doctrinal question is whether these diverse statutes, when interpreted together, can provide sufficient adjudicatory legitimacy in a dematerialized commercial environment increasingly shaped by algorithmic decision-making that transcends territorial boundaries.

5.1 Consumer Protection Act, 2019

5.1.1 Normative Shift from Reactive Redress to Regulatory Governance

“The Consumer Protection Act, 2019” (“CPA 2019”) (Consumer Protection Act, 2019) substitutes the 1986 Act to highlight procedural reshaping in consumer markets. The Statement of Objects and Reasons expressly highlight the growth of e-commerce, the prevalence of misleading advertisements, and the need for clear product liability mechanisms (Government of India, 2019).

Unlike the 1986 Act, which primarily ornated with a framework for adjudicating individual grievances, the CPA 2019 incorporates regulatory oversight. The formation of the “Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA)” represents a shift from purely private complaint resolution to proactive public enforcement.

“Section 2(16) of Consumer Protection Act, 2019”(Consumer Protection Act, 2019, § 2(16)) defines “e-commerce” is about to gulp the buying or selling of goods or services over digital networks. This explicit definition questions earlier jurisdictional arguments that online marketplaces fell outside the statute's scope. In primitive territorially bounded regulations it seems defendants can be served, summoned, and subjected to execution within national jurisdiction lacking the scope for independent mechanism for transnational enforcement.

5.1.2 Territorial Jurisdiction Under

Section 34(2) says complaints to be filed in the District Commission where the complainant either stays or is personally employed for gain (Consumer Protection Act, 2019, § 34(2)). This provision neglects geographic hurdles and prioritizes convenient consumer justice.

However, it is an era of **domestic territorial convenience** against the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It does not supersede established principles of international adjudicatory competence. Indian courts must still meet the territorial nexus requirements set out in the “Code of Civil Procedure, 1908” (Consumer Protection Act, 2019, § 34(2)).

Consequently, while the CPA facilitates easier access to forums within India, it does not directly question the implications concerning transboundary enforcement against foreign digital platforms that lack assets in the country.

5.1.3 Product Liability and Algorithmic Control

Chapter VI introduces product liability raise voice against manufacturers, service providers, and sellers (Consumer Protection Act, 2019, ch. VI). Section 85 enlarge the scope to cover sellers who exercise “substantial control” over aspects such as product design, testing, packaging, or labelling (Consumer Protection Act, 2019, § 35).

The doctrinal challenge is defining “substantial control” in the context of AI-driven marketplaces. Traditional product liability assumes physical goods and tangible manufacturing processes. In contrast, digital marketplaces exert algorithmic control over:

- product visibility,
- search ranking,

- personalized pricing,
- recommendation sequencing.

Such control can significantly influence consumer choice without modifying the physical product itself.

In “*Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta*”, (*Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta*, 1994) the Supreme Court of India relied on a purposive approach to consumer statutes, highlighting their remedial intent. By this logic, algorithmic manipulation that materially manipulate consumer decisions could arguably fall within the scope of “substantial control.”

However, no authoritative precedent has yet applied Section 85 to algorithmic governance, leaving the issue doctrinally unsettled.

5.1.4 Representative Complaints and Collective Harm

Hence under Section 35 of this act allows complaints be done by recognized consumer associations or by single or more users on behalf of others sharing the same consumer interest (Consumer Protection Act, 2019, § 35).

However, ‘this mechanism does not establish a structured opt-out class action system similar to “Rule 23 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure while missing detailed standards for certification, formal notice procedures, and methods for aggregating damages. Algorithmic harms often result in small, individualized losses, such as discriminatory dynamic pricing. Without safeguard against structured aggregation, incentives for enforcement are limited. As a result, the statute falls short in effectively addressing widespread digital injuries.

5.2 Central Consumer Protection Authority: Administrative Sovereignty Without Transnational Mechanism

The CCPA reign controls under Sections 18–27, including conducting investigations, issuing recall orders, imposing penalties, and prohibiting unfair trade practices (Consumer Protection Act, 2019, §§ 18–27) making a relocation toward public regulatory enforcement. However, the Authority’s jurisdiction is confined to Indian territory. The statute does not contain an explicit extraterritorial provision comparable to Article 3 GDPR.

In the absence of bilateral regulatory ornamentations, orders against foreign platforms may not be enforceable.

5.3 “Intermediary Liability Under the IT Act, 2000”

5.3.1 Safe Harbour and Neutrality

Section 79 of the “Information Technology Act, 2000” (Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79) embraces intermediaries with conditional immunity, as they exercise due diligence and do not initiate or alter the information being transmitted.

In “*Shreya Singhal v. Union of India*,” (*Shreya Singhal v. Union of India*, 2015) the Supreme Court of India clarified that intermediary liability calls for only on receipt of a court order or government notification. This interpretation reinforced safe harbour directives and curtailed private notice-and-takedown regimes.

However, the IT Act predates the advent of AI-driven recommender systems, and its immunity framework is premised on the notion of intermediaries as passive conduits.

5.3.2 Marketplace Platforms and Active Facilitation

In *Amazon and Amway India Enterprises case*, the Delhi High Court considered whether Amazon could ask for safe harbour protection at the same time when claiming authority over product listings and warehousing (*Amazon Seller Services v. Amway India*, 2020). The court noted that active involvement or control could negate intermediary immunity (*Amazon Seller Services v. Amway India*, 2021). Although this position was later moderated on appeal, (Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, § 3) the ruling marked judicial awareness of platform agency.

The doctrinal disjointment between a passive host and an active regulator is about to blurred, as algorithmic ranking systems can exert economic sway comparable to editorial oversight.

5.4. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023: (Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, § 3) Extraterritorial Ambition

Section 3 undertakes outside India matters if it pertains to offering goods or services to individuals within the country (Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 3(2)). This is similar to Article 3(2) of the GDPR (Regulation (EU) 2016/679, arts. 60–63). Though, the enforcement frameworks dissent noticeably. When GDPR works within a supranational regulatory network with mechanisms for administrative cooperation, (Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, § 18) the DPDP Act creates a “Data Protection Board of India” but forgets an embedded transnational supervisory structure (*Google LLC v. CNIL*, 2019).

In “*Google LLC v. CNIL*”, (Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 13) the CJEU declined to require worldwide delisting, stressing the principle of international comity. India’s extraterritorial provision could face comparable constraints if diplomatic reciprocity is absent.

5.5 Code of Civil Procedure: Recognition and Reciprocity

“Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code” structures the six exceptions under which foreign judgments are unenforceable, comprising the lack of jurisdiction, fraud, denial of natural justice, or violation of Indian public policy (*Amazon Seller Services v. Amway India*, 2020).

Section 44A permits execution of decrees from territories with which India keeps reciprocity (Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 44A) hence, such reciprocity is confined and relied on official notification.

In “*Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Celem S.A.*”, the Supreme Court emphasises the necessity for strict adherence to § 13 situations (*Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Celem S.A.*, 2017). In cross-border e-commerce implications, consumers desires to enforce foreign judgments may encounter procedural hurdles, while foreign claimants enforcing in India must meet reciprocity requirements. Overall, the CPC continued to be anchored in rigid traditional territorial sovereignty against digital transnationalism.

5.6 Rural Structural Exclusion and Constitutional Dimensions

Access to justice is encompassed within Article 21 jurisprudence (*Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India*, 1978). In “*Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan*” (*Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan*, 2016), the Supreme Court reassures that access to justice composes a fundamental right.

Yet, digital consumer remedies assume the presence of connectivity, literacy, and procedural knowledge, resources often lacking in rural areas. Enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries without addressing infrastructural lacunas risks formal equality without real access.

5.7 Comparative Regulatory Approaches

These confrontations posed by AI-driven digital marketplaces to territorial jurisdiction is not restricted to India. Courts and legislatures in major legal systems encounter quarries- how to align traditional territorial adjudicatory authority with borderless digital economic activity. Hence parallel studies denote significant disparities in constitutional philosophy, institutional design, and doctrinal approaches.

This section explores around four regulatory frameworks: (1) the European Union’s supranational rights-based constitutionalism; (2) the United States’ innovation-friendly model tempered by due process; (3) Singapore’s technocratic administrative governance; and (4) South Korea’s hybrid platform accountability regime. These examples offer insights into structural solutions for managing jurisdictional uncertainty and algorithmic opacity in transnational AI commerce.

5.7.1 European Union: Supranational Consumer Constitutionalism

The European stands tall as an emblem of audacious recognition to bridge trans-national digital commerce. This legal framework perches on two pillars- arbitral connection by Brussels I Recast and regulatory compliance with GDPR and Digital Services Act.

5.7.1.1 Consumer Jurisdiction and the “Directed Activity” Doctrine

Under Regulation “(EU) No. 1215/2012” (“Brussels I Recast”), special enforcement principles are curved for consumer contracts (Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, arts. 17–19). Consumers can question traders to the courts of consumer’s domicile under the shield of article 17-19 where the trader indicates activities to that member state (Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012).

“The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)” has interpreted “directed activities” purposively. In “*Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG*” and “*Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v. Heller*”, (*Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG; Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v. Heller*, 2010) the court points that “the accessibility to the website is not enough, the intention to affect consumers in forum state must be evident indicators like selection of language, foreign codes of dialing, choice, international dialing codes, currency references, and domain names.” This derivation presents “functional targeting test”. Jurisdiction is relied on economic orientation but subject to server location. The unempirical innovations are evident in varying the internet from uncontrolled unbounded space to protected commercial targeting.

The CJEU augments this idea in “*eDate Advertising GmbH v. X*” specifying that the victims of online defamation may sue either in the publisher’s domicile or in the Member State where their “centre of interests” lies (*eDate Advertising GmbH v. X*, 2011). Even though this case concerns mainly the personality rights, it’s rationale reindicates jurisdiction to loss recognition against physical enforcement.

This method alleviates regulatory uncertainty by enforcing consumer residence as a concrete bridge.

5.7.1.2 GDPR and Extraterritorial Sovereignty

“Article 3(2) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)” (Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 3(2)) initiates its jurisdiction to consumers, beyond EU who proposes products and commercial services to the Union. Such principle offers a positive transboundary regulatory approach.

Nevertheless, in ‘*Google LLC v. CNIL*, the CJEU’ (*Google LLC v. CNIL*, 2019) case universal following under “Right to be Forgotten” rule is declined (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065). Court feared universal application as it dangers moral hegemony and claims EU regulations to surrender before international comity. This deduction presents calibrated approach where the EU projects disciplinary authority outward but ends short of universal jurisdiction. The doctrinal equilibrium hangs between effectiveness and comity.

5.7.1.3 “Digital Services Act” and Systemic Risk Management provisions

“Regulation (EU) 2022/2065” (“Digital Services Act” or DSA) stresses a revolution from intermediary neutrality to systemic accountability (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, arts. 34–35). When possessing safe harbour principles generated from “Directive 2000/31/EC,” the DSA enforces risk assessment, transparency, and audit obligations on Very Large Online Platforms (Directive 2000/31/EC).

The DSA identifies that consumer choices and market identity is curated by algorithms. Such sites are now working as watchdog of the digital market and no more only a host. This is marked as the reactive reposition to proactive governance. Digital sovereignty now becomes active regulatory stewardship over territorial enforcement to EU.

5.7.2 United States: Constitutional Constraints and Innovation Immunity

Against this the United States establish electronic jurisdiction within the sphere of due process that brings a concrete commitment to intermediary security.

5.7.2.1 Personal Jurisdiction and Minimum Contacts

“Minimum contacts” stressing on fair play and substantial justice is claimed by personal jurisdiction decided in “*International Shoe Co. v. Washington*” (*International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 1945). “*Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc*” (*Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.*, 1997) gave birth to the sliding scale test on which courts sometimes rely for internet cases. Active commercial websites justify jurisdiction; passive sites do not. Nonetheless, where platforms repeatedly gather data, profile users and curate content AI driven personalisation seems challenging this taxonomy. It can be concluded that the electronic market is neither passive nor active but responsive towards algorithms. The Zippo regulations acquire data driven targeting inadequately in today’s digitally advanced commercial marketplace.

The Supreme Court’s deductions in “*Walden v. Fiore* (*Walden v. Fiore*, 2014) and *Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court*” (*Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California*, 2017) for another time prevents jurisdictional reach by questioning root canals among defendant conduct and forum state. This trend stops extranational consumer adjudication in the courts of United States.

5.7.2.2 Section 230 and Intermediary Immunity

Section 230(c)(1) of the “Communications Decency Act” protects digital commercial responsibility of third-party product (Communications Decency Act, 1996, § 230(c)(1)). In “*Zeran v. America Online, Inc.*” (*ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc.*, 1997) the Fourth Circuit elucidates such regulations poorly, shielding AOL from defamation liability. Very presently the court expanded its immune hand to platforms, wrongly take advantage of algorithms to suggest objects. In “*Force v. Facebook, Inc.*”, the Second Circuit held that such suggestions algorithms do not negate Section 230 immunity (*Force v. Facebook, Inc.*, 2019).

The American model backs novelty, innovation and unrestricted expression against consumer safeguards. Algorithmic opacity that claims platform liability is not addressed actively.

5.7.3 Singapore and South Korea: Administrative Governance

Singapore: Centralized Enforcement

“Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (PDPA)” pragmatize extraterritorially where institutions gather or culture personal data within Singapore (Personal Data Protection Act, 2012, § 4). Enforcement lies with the Personal Data Protection Commission, a specialized administrative body (Personal Data Protection Act, 2012, pt. VI). The system traces not the decentralized litigation but regulatory surveillance.

South Korea: Platform Accountability

South Korea make amendment to their “Telecommunication Business Act” to create obligations on online platforms, ensuring transparency (Telecommunications Business Act, 2020). Under the competition law the the ‘Korean Fair-trade Commission’ has also scrutinises platform governance, aiming at the algo-manipulation as unfair trade practice. This hybrid endeavour combines administrative oversight with competition-based bindingness.

5.7.5 Platform Liability and Algorithmic Opacity

Ai driven digital market assumes intermediary safety as a complex concept. In modern times platforms hosts and at the same time recommends, ranks, prioritises, determines rates with algo-initiatives. This stage inspects ‘safe harbour doctrine’, the ‘erosion of active/passive distinctions’, ‘dark pattern jurisprudence’, and emerging theories of algorithmic accountability.

Safe Harbour Doctrine: Normative Foundations and Erosion

Safe harbours are there as protective shields for digital innovation when the central concern lies in is platform neutrality. In spite of algo-reminder’s attempt to portray consumer exposure positively (*Zeran v. America Online, Inc.*, 1997) transparency becomes operational proprietary ranking criteria. The platform thereby exerts economic strength comparable to that of a traditional distributor.

In India, Section 79 of the “Information Technology Act, 2000” extends conditional safeguard to intermediaries (Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79). In “*Shreya Singhal v. Union of India*”, (*Shreya Singhal v. Union of India*, 2015) intermediary responsibility was questioned by the Supreme Court to gain understanding by court’s authorization or govt. notification. While protective of free speech, this framework does not address algorithmic amplification or ranking bias.

Active vs Passive Intermediaries

In between the active and passive intermediaries there underpins safe harbour doctrine. In “*Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Amway India Enterprises Pvt. Ltd*” (*Amazon Seller Services v. Amway India*, 2020) the Delhi High Court rethink if Amazon imply enough control on listing immunity lose. The court mark that core participation in the field of marketing, warehousing and payment processing is changing the platform as an active participant.

Dark Patterns and Manipulative Design

Informed consent is pinned down by manipulations like dark patterns that is explicitly restricted by the “Digital Services Act” (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, art. 25). Though Indian regulations like the “Consumer Protection Act 2019” (Consumer Protection Act, 2019, § 2(47)) questions manipulative practices in commercial sector but implications are there in electronic commerce. Proving algorithmic intent or discriminatory pricing requires technical transparency often unavailable to consumers.

Algorithmic Accountability and Private Power

Theory concerning algo-governance shapes platforms as normative regulatory authority over digital market which makes rules, details price mechanisms and moderate contents.

Primitive international law believes independent nations as main regulators. By trans boundary operations AI market places exercise guiding power.

6. NORMATIVE RECONSTRUCTION: TOWARDS DOCTRINAL CONVERGENCE IN DIGITAL CONSUMER JURISDICTION

The foregoing comparative and jurisprudential experiment illustrate that territorial complexities in AI-driven trans-boundary market areas are not only a procedural shortcoming but structural misalignment between territorial private international law and deterritorialized electronic commerce. The doctrinal vocabulary of “minimum contacts,” “purposeful availment,” and “territorial nexus” refined in the age of boundary restricted commercial actors. AI marketplaces, however, operate through algorithmic targeting, data extraction, and cloud-based infrastructure that renders physical presence conceptually secondary.

Prescriptive renovation therefore asks for beyond incremental doctrinal entitlement toward structural recalibration. This statutory regulation suggests five interconnected

This section proposes five interrelated rectification -

6.1 Consumer-Centric Jurisdiction Rule: From Territorial Nexus to Targeting-Based Adjudication

6.1.1 Theoretical Justification

In trans-boundary electronic disputes, the balance created between the predictability of defendants and access to justice of the plaintiff by the private international law has inclined disproportionately in the sids of the defendants, who crafts standard-form contracts, choose governing law, and structure transaction architecture.

A rule that is consumer inclined suggests that consumer habitual courts have adjudicatory speciality in places where platforms intentionally aim at commercial gain from the said market. This regulation extracts safeguard from the European Union’s “Brussels I Recast framework” (Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012). “Articles 17–19 of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012” entitles consumer domicile where traders “direct activities” to that Member State (Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, arts. 17–19). The CJEU’s purposive derivation in “*Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH*” & “*Co KG and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v. Heller*” (*Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG; Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v. Heller*, 2010) underscores that targeting not physical establishment triggers jurisdiction.

6.1.2 Application to AI Marketplaces

AI platforms deploy:

- Geo-targeted advertising
- Personalized recommendations
- Localized pricing
- Language and currency adaptation

These constitute purposeful digital availment. Beneath such consumer centric regulations those targeting should suffice to decide jurisdiction in the consumer’s forum. Such initiative synchronizes with the Delhi High Court’s understanding in “*Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy*,” which claims relevant taunting against mere accessibility (*Banyan Tree Holding v. Murali Krishna Reddy*, 2010).

6.1.3 Constitutional Compatibility

Tensions increase involving due process implications, significantly in United States. The Supreme Court in *Walden v. Fiore* highlights contacts of the defendant over plaintiff’s domicile anchor jurisdiction (*Walden v. Fiore*, 2014).

But algo-targeting establishes that the conduct of the defendant meaningfully aims at the forum where a distilled targeting test continues to be at pace with constitutional true regulations.

6.2 Mandatory Override of Unfair Forum Selection Clauses

AI marketplaces perform disciplinary integration of exclusive foreign regulations clauses in click-wrap agreements that productively oust consumer access to domestic courts.

6.2.1 Party Autonomy Versus Structural Inequality

The Supreme Court of India has highlighted party autonomy in commercial contracts (*Swastik Gases v. Indian Oil Corporation*, 2013) even though these contracts However, consumer contracts diverge radically as they are non-negotiated, adhesive, and standardized.

A theological tuning should make foreign forum clauses ostensibly ineffective in consumer contracts where entitlement would:

- Impose disproportionate cost burdens;
- Deprive consumers of statutory remedies;
- Undermine public policy protections.

These regulations have already been circled by European under “Brussels I Recast” (Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, art. 19).

6.2.2 Public Policy Exception

Section 13 of the “Code of Civil Procedure, 1908” enables denial of foreign decisional bindingness where in conflict to Indian public policy. Consumer protection statutes reflect concrete public policy ambitions.

Hence Indian adjudicating bodies justly prevent enforcement of foreign decisions.

6.3 Algorithmic Transparency as a Condition of Safe Harbour

6.3.1 From Neutrality to Structured Accountability

Safe harbour doctrine traditionally revived on intermediary neutrality. Section 79 of the “Information Technology Act, 2000” extends security subject to due diligence obligations (Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79). The Supreme Court in “*Shreya Singhal v. Union of India*” restrict intermediary liabilities to true understanding through court decision or governmental publication (Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79). Still in present day AI driven modern economy positively actively pastor, rank, and price goods where neutrality is presumed to be practically obsolete.

6.3.2 Conditional Immunity Framework

Immunity must subject to:

- Clear categorisation of ranking parameters;
- Proper ranking of sponsored placements;
- Clarity on in dynamic pricing logic;
- sovereign algorithmic audits.

The “EU Digital Services Act” (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065)” (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, arts. 25–27) gifts a partial template. Articles 25–27 prevents dark patterns and worships clarity (UNCITRAL, 1996). Safe harbour with conditions upon transparency combines liability doctrine with technological reality.

6.4 Treaty-Based Harmonization

Fragmented national regulations lights lacunas in forum shopping. An intergovernmental agreement on digital consumer security could merge:

- Jurisdictional standard
- Remembrance of ODR outcomes

- Algo-clarity benchmarks.

The “UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce” indicates precedent for uniform electronic regulations (Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, § 3).

6.5 Global Digital Consumer Charter

Out of the sphere of enforcement regulations digital commercial rights that a soft-law charter articulating minimum digital consumer rights could influence national reform. Key provisions includes-

1. Territorial jurisdictional authority in the consumer’s residence;
2. Precautions against manipulative interface design,
3. Transparency in AI regulated pricing Transparency in AI-driven pricing and ranking;
4. Collective redress mechanisms;
5. Data derogations and privacy regulations.

Soft-law instruments have historically reformed hard law evolution in international market.

Policy Recommendations

Simplifying reconstruction into actionable reform strongly desires coordinated legislative, judicial, and regulatory approach.

1. Statutory Codification of Targeting-Based Jurisdiction
2. Amendment of Intermediary Liability Framework
3. Integration of Data Protection and Consumer Law
4. Strengthening ODR Infrastructure
5. Institutional Capacity Building

7. Conclusion

Private international law encounters a punch in algorithm regulated cross-border commercial markets. Territorial margins resume to connect with hybrid economic activities. Algo driven systems intermediate transactions, shape consumer choice, and structure market visibility across borders. Comparative study concentrates on partial alignment towards outcome-oriented regulations. The “Court of Justice of the European Union” (*Google Spain SL v. AEPD*, 2014) demands consumer inclined adjudicatory reciprocity along with international comity. The United States Supreme Court actively enforce due process regulations along with meaningful targeting (*Walden v. Fiore*, 2014). Indian courts proactively enlarge jurisdiction where digital targeting is demonstrable (*Banyan Tree Holding v. Murali Krishna Reddy*, 2010).

Even though scriptural solitude stays intact. Under the shadows of reformative lacunas consumers encounters:

- Forum skewness;
- Obscure algo-manipulation;
- Accessibility constrains across jurisdictions.

Electronic sovereignty needs to be reconsidered not as jurisdictional monopoly but as constructive disciplines schooling inhouse consumers.

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